Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics (1893)

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The friendship of children for their parents (like that of men for the gods) is friendship
for what is good and superior to themselves, as the source of the greatest benefits,
namely, of their life and nurture, and their education from their birth upwards.
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Friendship of this kind brings with it more, both of pleasure and profit, than that of
strangers, in proportion as there is more community of life.
The friendship of brothers has all the characteristics of the friendship of comrades,
and has them in a greater degree (provided they are good and generally resemble one
another) inasmuch as they belong more to one another and love each other from their
birth up, and have more similarity of character, as being of the same stock and
brought up together and educated alike; moreover, they have had the longest and the
surest experience of one another.
In all other kinsmen s friendships the same elements will be found in proportion to the
relationship.
The friendship of man and wife seems to be natural; for human beings are by nature
more apt to join together in couples than to form civil societies, inasmuch as the
family is prior in time to the state and more indispensable, and the propagation of the
species is a more fundamental characteristic of animal existence. The other animals
associate for this purpose alone, but man and wife live together not merely for the
begetting of children, but also to satisfy the needs of their life: for the functions of the
man and the woman are clearly divided and distinct the one from the other; they
supply each other s wants, therefore, both contributing to the common stock. And so
this sort of friendship is thought to bring with it both pleasure and profit. But it will be
based on virtue, too, if they be good; for each sex has its own virtue, and both will
rejoice in that which is of like nature.
Children also seem to be a bond that knits man and wife together (which is a reason
why childless unions are more quickly dissolved); for children are a good which both
have in common, but that which people have in common holds them together.
To ask on what terms a man should live with his wife, and generally friend with
friend, seems the same as to ask what justice requires in these cases; for what is
required of a man towards his friend is different from what is required of him towards
a stranger, a comrade, or a fellow-student.
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13.
Of The Terms Of Interchange And Quarrels Hence Arising In
Equal Friendships.
There are three kinds of friendship, as we said at the outset, and in each kind there are
both equal and unequal friendships; I mean that sometimes two equally good persons
make friends, and sometimes a better and a worse, and so with those who are
pleasant to one another, and with those who are friends with a view to
profit sometimes rendering equal services to one another, and sometimes unequal.
Now, those who are equal should effect equality by loving one another, etc., equally,
but those who are unequal should effect equality by making what each renders
proportionate to the greater or less merit of the other.
But accusations and reproaches arise solely or mostly in friendships whose motive is
profit, as we should expect. For those whose friendship is based on virtue are eager to
do good to each other (for this is the office of virtue and friendship); and between
people who are thus vieing with one another no accusations or quarrels can arise; for a
man cannot be embittered against one who loves him and does him a service, but, if
he be of a gracious nature, requites him with a like service. And he who renders the
greater service will not reproach his friend, since he gets what he desires;* for each
desires what is good.
Such quarrels, again, are not apt to arise in friendships whose motive is pleasure; for
both get at the same time that which they desire, if they delight in each other s
company; but if one were to accuse the other for not being agreeable to him, he would
make himself ridiculous, seeing that he was under no compulsion to associate with
him.
But the friendship whose motive is utility is fruitful in accusations; for as the friends
here use each other solely with a view to their own advantage, each always wants the
larger share and thinks he has less than his due, and reproaches the other with not
doing for him so much as he requires and deserves; though, in truth, it is impossible
for the one who is doing a service to supply all that the other wants.
But it seems that as the rules of justice are two-fold, the unwritten and those that are
set down in laws, so the friendship whose motive is utility is of two kinds one
resting on disposition, the other on contract. And accusations are most apt to arise
when the relation is understood in one sense at the commencement, and in the other
sense at the conclusion.
That which rests on contract is that in which there are specified conditions, and it is of
two kinds: one is purely commercial, on the principle of cash payments; the other is
less exacting in point of time, though in it also there is a specified quid pro quo.
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In the latter case, what is due is evident and cannot be disputed, but there is an
element of friendliness in the deferment of payment; for which reason, in some states,
there is no recovery by law in such cases, but it is held that when a man has given
credit he must take the consequences.
That which rests on disposition has no specified conditions, but one gives another
presents (or whatever else it may be) as a friend. But afterwards he claims as much or
more in return, regarding what he gave not as a gift, but as a loan. And thus, wishing
to terminate the relation in a different spirit from that in which he entered upon it, he
will accuse the other.* And this is apt to happen because all or nearly all men, though
they wish for what is noble, choose what is profitable; and while it is noble to do a
good service without expecting a return, it is profitable to receive a benefit.
In such cases, then, we should, if we have the power, make an equivalent return for
benefits received (for we must not treat a man as a friend if he does not wish it: we
should consider that we made a mistake at the beginning, and received a benefit from
a person from whom we ought not to have accepted it for he was not a friend and
did not act disinterestedly and so we ought to terminate the relation in the same way
as if we had received a service for a stipulated consideration): and the return should
be what we would have agreed* to repay if able; if we were unable, the donor would [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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