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of the label - would have to be the same findable "thing." Being "many" means the "me"
would be something totally different from its basis, so that the "me" and its basis would
"many" totally different, unrelated findable "things."]
The text then presents various absurd conclusions that would follow in either case. If the "me"
were one with its basis for labeling, the two would always have to be the same - they could
never be separate. If it were different from or "many" with its basis of labeling, then since
there are many different bases for labeling "me," there would have to be many different
"me's." We can find all these lines of reasoning in standard texts, such as Chandrakirti's
Supplement to (Nagarjuna's "Root Verses on) the Middle Way".
The "me" is also described in terms of what comes from many lives in the past. If the "me"
had no relation to the continuity of the experiences of past lifetimes, then the whole process of
cause and effect would not be able to work. The "me" in this lifetime would experience the
results of actions committed by somebody totally irrelevant in the past. If that were the case,
what happens to us would be chaotic. Since we could experience the results of actions of just
anybody, anything could happen to us. This is not the case.
The Lack of Truly Established Existence of All Phenomena
Thus far, we have discussed grasping at the truly established existence of a "me." Now the
text examines grasping at the truly established existence of "mine" - in other words, what a
"me" might experience or possess. This refers to grasping for the truly established existence of
all phenomena.
Discussing the lack of a truly established identity or "soul" of all phenomena, the text uses the
same argument of "neither one nor many," and describes how the existence of things can only
be established as merely what can be labeled on the network of their parts, causes, and so
The Lack of Truly Established Existence of All Phenomena 88
A Commentary on Attitude-Training Like the Rays of the Sun - His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama
forth. Then the text discusses the relationship between a whole and its parts, particularly in
terms of dependent arising. Things are related to each other because their various parts and
causes are related to and dependent upon each other, and that is how results come about.
Dependent arising means that things come about as a result of being dependent or reliant upon
various other things. The only possible way for that to function would be for things not to
have a truly established independent existence of their own. If things had truly established
independent existence all by themselves, they would be able to stand, figuratively, on their
own feet. If they could do that, they would not have to depend on anything else or have any
relation with anything else. In that case, neither could they enter into any relationship with
other things in terms of dependent arising, since they would be totally self-sufficient. As an
image in a mirror doesn't just arise by itself, things cannot arise without depending on certain
circumstances.
Take the example of a man who walks with a cane. If he walks with a cane, he can't stand on
his own. In other words, the existence of his standing can only be established dependently on
his leaning on a cane. So these two possibilities are mutually exclusive. His standing can only
be established either independently on his own or dependently arising on his leaning on a
cane.
If we speak in terms of all phenomena, then likewise their existence can only be established
either independently on their own or dependently on other phenomena. [These two mutually
exclusive possibilities form a dichotomy: things can only be one or the other, and not both or
neither.] For example, if we divide all phenomena into either human or non-human, then all
phenomena have to fall into one of these categories, as either human or non-human. But if we
divide phenomena into the categories of human and vase, that doesn't cover all existent
phenomena, because there are things that are neither human nor vase. [Thus, although human
and vase are mutually exclusive - nothing can be both a human and a vase - they do not form a
dichotomy.]
Just as in our example of dividing things into human or non-human, which covers all
phenomena, likewise phenomena are either dependent on other things or not dependent on
other things; there are only the two possibilities. If the existence of something can only be
established in terms of other things, then that would accord with saying that the existence of
things can only be established dependently. On the other hand, if we determine that the
existence of things can be established by their own power, on their own, without relying on
anything else, they would have truly established, independent existence. So there are only two
possibilities: as with human or non-human, things can only be one or the other.
When we refute or disprove that the existence of things can be established independently on
their own, disconnected from all other things, we're left with only one other possibility. The
existence of things can only be established dependently on other things - specifically on what
names and concepts refer to.
Take, for example, the word middle. This word can only be understood as referring to
something not on the left side or the right side. The existence of a "middle" can only be
established in terms of or in relation to something being neither one side nor the other.
Likewise, when we speak of Madhyamaka, the "Middle Way," we understand it to mean a
position that is established in terms of its being neither of two extremes. The two extremes are
the nihilist position and the eternalist position. When the existence of things cannot either be
established independently [which would render them eternal since they could not be affected
The Lack of Truly Established Existence of All Phenomena 89
A Commentary on Attitude-Training Like the Rays of the Sun - His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama
by causes in order to arise or perish] or not established at all [which would render everything
as totally nonexistent, then in relation to those two extreme positions, we are left with a
"middle way."] We then know that the existence of things can only be established dependently
on other things. So, voidness - the total absence of impossible ways of establishing the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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