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identity-compulsion through the stored-up energies which are bound up in its
concretizations. This ended up partly prevailing in Hegel, who indeed could not confess
to what was untrue in the identity-compulsion. In that the concept experiences itself as
non-identical and moves, it leads, no longer merely itself, to what Hegelian terminology
terms its Other,3 without sucking it dry. It determines itself by that which is outside it,
because it does not exhaust itself according to what is its own. As itself it is not at all
merely it itself. Where Hegel in the Science of Logic deals with the synthesis of the first
triad, that of becoming,4 it is only after he equates being and nothingness as what is
entirely empty and devoid of determination, that he pays attention to the difference which
registers the absolute divergence of the literal linguistic meaning of both concepts. He
refined his earlier doctrine that identity could be meaningfully predicated, that is to say
more than tautologically, only by the non-identical: only when identified with each other,
by means of its synthesis, would the moments become non-identical. From this the
assertion of their identity accrued that restlessness, which Hegel called becoming: it
trembles in itself. As the consciousness of non-identity through identity dialectics is not
only a progressive but a simultaneously retrograde process; to this extent the image of a
circle describes it accurately. The development of the concept is also a reaching back, the
synthesis the determination of the difference which perished in the concept,
disappeared ; almost as in Hoelderlin s anamnesis of what is natural, which fell away.
Only in the consummated synthesis, the unification of the contradictory moments, is their
difference revealed. Without the step that being would be the same as nothingness, both
would be indifferent to each other, to use a favorite term of Hegel; only when they are
supposed to be the same, do they become contradictory. Dialectics is not ashamed of the
reminiscence of the Echternach spring parade. Unquestionably Hegel had, against Kant,
delimited the priority of the synthesis: in keeping with the model of the later Platonic
dialogue, he cognized the Many and the One [Einheit: the One, the unitary], which Kant
regarded as contiguous categories, as moments, neither of which would be without the
other. Nevertheless Hegel is, like Kant and the entire tradition, including Plato, a partisan
of the One. Not even its abstract negation deserves thinking. The illusion of holding the
Many immediately in hand would recoil as mimetic regression back into mythology, into
the horror of the diffuse, just as the counter-pole of unitary thinking [Einheitsdenken], the
imitation of blind nature through its suppression, ends up in mythical domination. The
self-reflection of the Enlightenment is not its revocation: it is corrupted into the latter for
the sake of the contemporary status quo. Even the self-critical turn of unitary thinking
rests upon concepts, congealed syntheses. The tendency of the synthesizing acts is to be
redirected, by becoming aware of what it inflicts upon the Many. Solely the One
transcends the One. In it the affinity is granted its right to exist, which was driven back
by the advance of the One and nevertheless, secularized to the point of unrecognizability,
hibernates in it. The syntheses of the subject imitate, as Plato well knew, what that
synthesis, mediately [mittelbar], with the concept, wishes on its own.
Critique of Positive Negation 161-163
The non-identical is not to be won immediately as something positive for its part and also
not through the negation of the negative. This latter is not itself, as in Hegel, the
affirmation. The positive, which to him is supposed to result from the negation, has more
than just its name in common with that positivity which he fought in his youth. The
equation of the negation of the negation with positivity is the quintessence of
identification, the formal principle reduced to its purest form. With it the anti-dialectical
principle wins the upper hand in the innermost core of dialectics, that traditional logic,
which more arithmetico [Latin: in mathematical terms] books minus times minus as a
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