McTaggart Hegelian Cosmology

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possibility of finding a cause, there disappears also the necessity of
finding one. Self-subsistence is not in itself a contradictory or impos-
sible idea. It is contradictory if applied to anything in the universe, for
whatever is in the universe must be in connection with other things. But
this can of course be no reason for suspecting a fallacy when we find
ourselves obliged to apply the idea to something which has nothing out-
Studies in Hegelian Cosmology/217
side it with which it could stand in connection. To put the matter in
another light, we must consider that the necessity of finding causes and
reasons for phenomena depends on the necessity of showing why they
have assumed the particular form which actually exists. The enquiry is
thus due to the possibility of things happening otherwise than as they
did, which possibility, to gain certain knowledge, must be excluded by
assigning definite causes for one event rather than the others. Now ev-
ery possibility must rest on some actuality. And the possibility that the
whole universe could be different would have no such actuality to rest
on, since the possibility extends to all reality. There would be nothing in
common between the two asserted alternatives, and thus the possibility
of variation would be unmeaning. And therefore there can be no reason
to assign a determining cause.
The necessity which exists for all knowledge to rest on the immedi-
ate does not, then, indicate any imperfection which might prove a bar to
the development of spirit. For we have seen that the impulse which causes
us even here to demand fresh mediation is unjustified, and, indeed, mean-
ingless. But we shall have to consider, in the second part of this chapter,
whether the possibility of making even the unjustified demand does not
indicate that for complete harmony we must go on to something which
embraces and transcends knowledge.
270. Let us now pass on to the ideal of volition. We must in the first
place exclude, as incompatible with such an ideal, all volition which
leads to action. For action implies that you have not something which
you want, or that you will be deprived of it if you do not fight for it, and
both these ideas are fatal to the fundamental and complete harmony
between desire and environment which is necessary to the perfect devel-
opment of spirit.
Nor can virtue have a place in our ideal, even in the form of aspira-
tion. Together with every other imperfection, it must be left outside the
door of heaven. For virtue implies a choice, and choice implies either
uncertainty or conflict. In the realised ideal neither of these could exist.
We should desire our truest and deepest well-being with absolute neces-
sity, since there would be nothing to deceive and tempt us away. And we
should find the whole universe conspiring with us to realise our desire.
The good would be ipso facto the real, and virtue would have been
transcended.
The ideal of volition is rather the experience of perfect harmony
between ourselves and our environment which excludes alike action and
218/John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart
choice. This involves, in the first place, that we should have come to a
clear idea as to what the fundamental demands and aspirations of our
nature are. Till we have done this we cannot expect harmony. All other
desires will be in themselves inharmonious, for, driven on by the inevi-
table dialectic, they will show themselves imperfect, transitory, or de-
fective, when experienced for a sufficiently long time, or in a suffi-
ciently intense degree. And, besides this, the very fact that the universe
is fundamentally of the nature of spirit, and therefore must be in har-
mony with us when we have fully realised our own natures, proves that
it cannot be permanently in harmony with us as long as our natures
remain imperfect. For such a harmony with the imperfect would be an
imperfection, out of which it would be forced by its own dialectic.
And this harmony must extend through the entire universe. If every-
thing (or rather everybody) in the universe is not in harmony with us our
ends cannot be completely realised. For the whole universe is connected
together, and every part of it must have an effect, however infinitesimal,
upon every other part. Our demands must be reconciled with, and realised
by, every other individual.
And, again, we cannot completely attain our own ends unless ev-
eryone else has attained his own also. For, as was mentioned in the last
paragraph, we cannot attain our own ends except by becoming in per-
fect harmony with the entire universe. And this we can only do in so far
as both we and it have become completely rational. It follows that for
the attainment of our ends it would be necessary for the entire universe
to have explicitly developed the rationality which is its fundamental
nature. And by this self-development every other individual, as well as
ourselves, would have attained to the perfection of volition. Moreover,
looking at the matter more empirically, we may observe that some de-
gree of sympathy seems inherent to our nature, so that our pleasure in
someone else s pain, though often intense, is never quite unmixed. And
on this ground also our complete satisfaction must involve that of all
other people.
271. We have now determined the nature of perfected knowledge [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

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